A significant number of European electors are turning their backs on traditional mainstream parties. European party systems are being challenged by an increasing number of (new) radical parties, which defied the Christian-social democrat alternation that has dominated Western European countries for decades. In Spain, a political earthquake started after the 2014 European Parliament election. In the context of the worst global economic crisis in the last 80 years (which in Spain is also a social, political and institutional crisis), a party called Podemos won 7.9% of votes and five MEPs, significantly altering the traditional balance of the Spanish party system. This paper studies the causes of the support received by Podemos on 2014 EP elections, dissects its political strategy and analyses the characteristics of the electorate that made possible the birth of this new party. The analysis, which is illustrated using micro-data of twelve surveys, discloses Podemos political agenda.
to come to an agreement to form a new government. This has led to repeat, in just six months, the 2015 General election and the event of a third election is ultimately feasible. On the other hand, the emergence of Podemos has generated a new and innovative dynamic in the Spanish political arena (forcing big parties to respond to the grave problems presented not only by the economy but also by the political and institutional system) and also has resulted in more plural regional and national parliaments.
Both phenomena, a hurricane and Podemos, cannot only be compared for their effects but also for their dynamics. A hurricane starts quietly but develops quickly gaining in strength over large areas of warm water, diminishing as it spreads across land. Similarly, after the wave of social outrage that heated the political climate in Spain in 2011 [1] , support for this new political force rapidly gained momentum within those electorates who no longer identified themselves with the traditional political parties, blaming them for the state of the country. The growth of support, however, slowed down once reaching more loyal electorate areas. On occasions, nevertheless, hurricanes can travel hundreds of kilometres inland causing severe flooding and, what's more, their positive feedback loop of air currents continue growing whilst the conditions are favourable for their development.
The aim of this research is not to predict the future trajectory of hurricane Podemos. This paper just analyses Podemos first year of live. The goals of this research are to analyze, from a neutral, scientific and external position, the reasons for the Podemos phenomenon, to discern the strategy followed by its leaders to capitalise on the circumstances, and to identify where its initial votes comes from and what the ideological and socio-demographic profile is of the citizens that made possible the irruption of this new party. Section 2 offers some details about Podemos birth and its meteoric evolution. Section 3 shows a profile of the situation in Spain when Podemos was born. Section 4 explores the keys of Podemos success and goes deep by dissecting its political strategy. Section 5 focuses on studying the characteristics of Podemos supporters and from where their supports come from. Section 6 concludes.
The Birth of Podemos
Podemos was born as a political force on 14 January, 2014, when a group of academics, journalists and social activists published a manifesto with the objective of "converting the indignation into political change" by developing a political platform capable of presenting a candidacy at the European Parliamentary elections four months later. On 11 March, the group was registered as a political party and by 21 April Podemos had col- From that moment, and with the objective of winning the next general elections, the group started a process of institutionalization as a party, celebrating its Asamblea Ciudadana the weekend of [18] [19] October, 2014 and starting to elect representatives for its new regional and local organizational structure. The political proposition of Podemos was based on an encouragement of social policies, a reinforcement of the fight against political corruption and an increase of direct democracy. Amid this process, CIS barometer [2] stood Podemos as the third most powerful political force, with levels of support similar to PP and PSOE. Forecasts from all polls placed Podemos as one of the three main parties of Spain (see Figure 1) .
In less than a year, a political formation that appeared from nowhere has become a credible political alternative to confront the two traditional major parties of the Spanish political panorama and has achieved it by changing the scene of the political competition. The electoral choice set out by Podemos asks the voter to choose not between Left and Right but between the people (Podemos) and la casta (PP and PSOE), the latter being blamed for the critical situation in which Spain found itself.
This new discursive strategy of Podemos is what has led many political analysts to compare it to Populism, a feature seen in many of the new parties that have emerged across Europe during the last few years in reaction to the economic, social, political and institutional crises Europe is living. These populist parties, despite the differences between them and the difficulties the concept entails, have won as a whole almost a quarter of MEPs: Syriza in Greece, MoVimento 5 Stelle in Italy, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, National Front in France or UKIP in the United Kingdom, to which we can add Podemos in Spain. From Left, Podemos performs a radical criticism of the Spanish party system, the way the political system works, the European process of decision-making, the austerity policies and the management of debt. Its scope is Spanish, but its impact is European. The emergence and 
The Political Situation in Spain at the Beginning of 2014
In this research, we inquire into the reasons why a phenomenon such as Podemos has occurred, a situation rarely seen within party systems. For more than three decades the two biggest Spanish parties, PP and PSOE, have secured between them an electoral support of around 80% of votes, and so has been until January 2014, when Podemos appeared. What was the political situation of Spain at that time?
After almost three decades of uninterrupted growth and prosperity, in 2008 Spain was hammered, equally to other European countries, by a striking economic crisis: increase in unemployment, cuts in public services, poverty growth and other related blights. The economic crisis became associated with an institutional crisis. Citizens now not only mistrusted Government and Opposition but they mistrusted the whole political system. The constitutional framework that had stood in Spain for three long decades was suddenly losing its lustre for citizens. In little time, they realised that the country was being "governed" by foreign ministries in other countries; that the monarchy was not what it seemed; that judicial power was biased; that the great political parties were rife with corruption; that judges who pursued corrupt politicians and their allies were side-lined in their careers, whilst the sentences given to the convicted were never served; that Catalonia wanted independence; that the black economy accounted for a quarter of GDP; that administration and public services were rapidly deteriorating. To sum up, Crown, Parliament, Judiciary, Constitutional Court, the territorial organization of the country, small businesses, the welfare state; all under question within the economic crisis.
To demonstrate the cataclysm that occurred in a political and social system that, until then, had been highly valued by its citizens, we can compare the responses to questions about institutions carried out by CIS in 1998 ( [4] - [6] ) with those performed in 2012 and 2013 ( [7] - [9] ). In Figure 2 , which shows the value given by Spaniards to institutions and institutional frameworks in 1998 and fifteen years later, one can see the enormous deterioration that these institutions have suffered. The average Spaniard stated a growing disaffection with its key institutions. Citizens tend to be clearly dissatisfied with how democracy works because they do not perceive elites sharing their concerns and feel that these are neither attentive nor responsive to society needs [10] .
If the crisis of confidence in the Spanish political system and its institutions was already apparent in 2012, the January 2014 CIS barometer [11] 
The Roots of Podemos Success
The situation, as we have shown, was ripe for a political figure to occupy this space. 
The Origin of Podemos. A Common Experience
The leaders of Podemos are young, but neither naive nor newcomers to politics. Pablo Over several years, this group not only theorised over politics following the ideology of Ernesto Laclau (see next subsection), but they also collaborated with governments of some Latin-American countries through CEPS foundation. This common experience, universitary and Latin-American, was cohesive enough to create a group capable of drafting new political initiatives in a country in crisis and to do so with new tactics, both in theoretical and practical terms.
A New Analysis of Reality. A New Discourse
The leaders of Podemos have shaped their view of politics in the context of post-Marxism 2 A year later C's followed Podemos track, claiming being a more reliable alternative but fishing mainly among former PP supporters.
and, more specifically, in the context of post-structuralism. The post-structuralism "is a theoretical approach to knowledge and society that embraces the ultimate un-decidability of meaning, the constitutive power of discourse, and the political effectivity of theory and research" ( [16] , p. 95). Post-structuralism interprets economic rationalities as social constructs, taking various historical forms, specific regional ways of development and clearly defined geographies [17] . Identifying criticisms of the dominant knowledge provides the ability to challenge such concepts and develop alternative constructs.
In this sense, perhaps the most influential philosopher of the group is Ernesto Laclau [15] , the leader of the so-called "Essex School of discourse analyses", who along with Chantal Mouffe wrote Hegemony and Socialist strategy [18] , which many recognise as a foundational work of post-Marxism. The book attempts to overcome the limitations of economic Marxist determinism and of class struggle as the only factors in social unrest.
Society is divided and pluralist hostilities are generated within it. This is the reason why one cannot talk of a universal class or even a workers' identity. According to Laclau and Mouffle ( [18] , p. 84), "a fragmentation of positions' exists within the social agents themselves, and that these therefore lack an ultimate rational identity". A society without hostilities seemed impossible and Laclau and Mouffle tried to unite in a new process of identification, but on other foundations, the working class and the new social movements. The last part of Laclau's approach comes from the necessity to have a leader that expresses the hegemony as a cohesive identity. According to Laclau [19] , when the popular masses previously excluded are incorporated into the political arena, new, less orthodox forms of leadership emerge from the liberal democratic point of view, such as Populism which, far from being an obstacle, guarantees democracy. For Laclau, Populism represents the essence of politics, that is, the creation of "We"; "We" that, following Carl Smith, can only be made antagonistically. It requires the construction of a global political subject that brings together the plurality of social demands. According to Laclau [20] , this "We" needs a leader to represent it, "[i]n any process of representation there is always going to exist a double movement. One from the represented towards the representatives and another from the representative towards the represented. In this process, the identity of the latter is complemented and reconstructed by way of representation".
This revolutionary process has in Laclau's agenda a critical moment when institutions are unable to respond and they systematically block social demands, i.e., when a global crisis of trust occurs. When citizens are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy it is the time of the populism break. The time for a new dichotomous division of society, but on new foundations that are not Marxist but populist: the people against the elites, the poor against the rich, the radical democracy against the ill and deciduous liberal democracy ( [21] , p. 155).
The application in discursive terms of this theoretical scheme to the Spanish reality by Podemos has been well summarised by [22] : "The first success of Podemos was to give the enemy a name: la casta… Once the contrary was named…all that was needed was that a group of… good communicators, experts in the use of the Internet… would build a… reconstruction of the world as a series of dichotomies: people versus the cast, (…) new politics versus old politics, common sense versus ideology, room for decisions versus party logic, the real country versus a country of elites, democracy versus oligarchy and the social majority versus the privileged minority".
Examples of this dichotomous reconstruction of the world in terms of the struggle of the people against la casta were numerous in Podemos discourse. An example of but a few quotes from its discourses are: "The left and the right parties of the regime seem very similar. Their sources, their appearance, their language, even their kind of politics are similar and, more important than the differences between them, is the difference that separates them from the average person"; "Europe is governed by absolutists and we will be their sans-culottes"; "The fight is between democratic possibilities or oligarchic closure"; "The problem is that if those who govern are the stewards of economic powers and not messengers for the citizens then things become complicated"; "If people do not get involved in politics, then others will"; "Podemos is the instrument of the underdog to beat the regime".
A New Strategy. Replacing the Cleavage
As Podemos said in its foundation political communication of October 2014, "the 15-M movement, along with the demonstrations that began, helped to articulate part of the dissatisfactions that had been, until then, ignored and depoliticized…One of the challenges for those representing Podemos was to articulate this unrest and its source" [23] .
For this, they relied on their ability to think in strategic terms: "Not only we are good people with good ideas, we are also strategists and we are here to win" (Pablo Iglesias in an interview on TV). What they were also clear about, and what they themselves have stated in their political paper, is that the context of the present economic crisis had opened "a window of opportunity" to seize power ( [15] , p. 27) that required to act quickly before the PP use the economic recuperation as a tool and the PSOE fill "the vacant space: the moment is now".
Until the European elections in May the strategy of Podemos was to win as a complete alternative, deprecating the parties of la casta and using a fundamentally critical discourse, with little concrete details. Podemos had centred its strategy of denouncing la casta as being corrupt and incapable of solving the problems of Spain, refusing to be drawn into any other debate-such as abortion or territorial organization-that might distract voters from its priority: that the fight is not that between Left and Right but between the people (Podemos) and la casta (the traditional parties, especially PP and PSOE but also IU or the nationalists CiU and PNV). Podemos focused on replacing the main cleavages of Spanish politics (Left vs. Right, Centre vs. Periphery) with a new cleavage: we (the people) against they (the elite, including politicians). According to Errejón ([24] , p. 29), "the issue is not that two sides preexist, i.e., subjects faced, and then the discourse that justifies them. The discourse is an activity that not only shows but creates, creates meaning, and is therefore a pre-formative activity. (…) The sides, the dispute between us and the others (those who are left out) are forged in the exercise of hegemonic relations".
The crisis in the model of representation and of the political parties had slowly but consistently weakened the electoral grounds of all the parties and their root identities 
Bridges to Society: Circles, Social Networks, Media and a New Leadership
Going public through a manifesto at the beginning of 2014, with limited financial means and without an organic structure as support, Podemos had to face national elections in just four months, being unknown to the public, against some competitors that had all these means and, furthermore, were well known. This is what is so surprising about the phenomenon Podemos: how could it obtain more than a million votes, almost 8% of cast votes? The answer had to be sought, beyond a capable, cohesive group with political experience and with a discourse and a defined and relevant strategy, in the bridges they built to win the confidence of a large part of voters: "Some carry out politics by putting up walls, we do it by building bridges". These bridges, in our opinion, are fourfold: discussion groups, social networks, mass media and a charismatic leader.
Circles (Discussion Groups)
The circles are discussion groups of people who regularly meet, face to face, to debate 3 Election after election, the level of identification with the parties was less and the proportion of voters deciding their vote at the last minute increased. In 1996 General election barely 9% of voters declared to have reached a decision during the campaign [25] . In 2011 this proportion had almost tripled: 24% of voters reported having decided their vote during the campaign, with 11% in the last week and even 6% on Election Day [26] . This structure worked through the EP campaign and was a motivational element for
Podemos activists during the party foundation. Indeed, Podemos logo is made up with several circles. However, although this structure has continued, after October 2014 they have given way to a new organic structure with an elected team and an electoral system on the internet.
Social Networks
The electoral campaign on the social networks started to gain importance after Obama's triumph in 2008 [29] . Campaigning in social networks had more impact than circles and it required few resources, just access to the internet, a mobile phone or a computer, and the knowledge to succeed in the digital world. These are no special requirements for Podemos members and cadres. They are people with a lot of experience in the use of digital tools for political intervention and social mobilisation, even before 15-M movement. For example, the famous "flash mob" [30] , which follows 11-M Madrid Islamic terrorist attacks and calls for demonstrations the day before 2004 Spanish General Elections, was initiated (as Pablo Iglesias revealed on a television interview) by people close to Podemos committee. In fact, as Ana Aldea, Redlines consultant, states "the preparation behind Podemos was very good and there was no need to train their activists to use social networks because they were already active in them. So, no need for slogans like in big parties, they moved on the internet in a natural way". [31] .
With a group of between 15 and 20 volunteers organised in shifts from 10.00 to 23.00 hrs, the effort reaped results. Indeed, according to November 2014 figures [32] , Podemos was the political group with the most support shown on networks (428,000 followers on Twitter, against 81,000 for PSOE and 177,000 for PP; and 856,000 in Facebook, way ahead of PP 77,000 and PSOE 73,000). In comparing leaders, Pablo Iglesias led with 663,000 followers on Twitter against 614,000 for Rajoy (PP) and 96,000 for Pedro Sánchez (PSOE). To this, it should be added the tens of regional and sector accounts promoted from Podemos circles and assemblies in Spain and the rest of the world. 
Mass Media

A New Leadership
The fourth bridge to society is marked out by the figure of the leader. A figure that, ac- 
Who Votes Podemos
The European Parliamentary election of May 2014 was the first electoral process in which Podemos participated. In it, Podemos obtained 1,253,837 votes and five seats of the 54 Spanish MEPs. This result was both a surprise and an unprecedented electoral success, although just a year after its born this seemed quite poor considering the expectations of electoral growth that polls showed for then (see Figure 1 ) and, moreover, after seeming its results in recent regional and national elections.
Recall vote is an important indicator in electoral behaviour analysis and one of the basic ingredients for bias correction of Spanish polls [34] . When voters in an electoral
survey are inquired what they just voted for (in an exit poll) or what they had voted for, some days previously or even four years ago, the aggregate results practically never coincide with the actual election outcomes. This mismatch is not related to sampling error, neither to the quality of fieldwork nor to measurement errors [35] . The mismatch between actual and poll outcomes is mainly related to nonresponse bias (although, sometimes, it is also related to the difference between what people do and what they would have liked to have done). In election polls, nonresponse bias appears as a consequence of differences in the probability of supporters of various parties to either provide an answer of their vote or to partake in the survey, so the discrepancy represents an excellent indicator of the social stigma attached to each party, i.e., what the majority believe is viewed as right or wrong.
The differences between aggregated recall votes and actual voting result tends to favour winning candidates due to bandwagon and spiral of silent effects [36] , with clear underestimations of losing candidates. The results of the post-electoral survey of CIS [37] , carried out only a few days after EP elections, showed that recall vote for Podemos achieved the highest positive difference by far: 8% of the census recorded as having voted for Podemos (compared to 3.4% in reality). This result points to Podemos as the biggest winner in the election from a public opinion perspective.
Usually, however, the differences are generally not so large qualitatively. Probably, on this occasion, the higher recall vote towards Podemos might indicate the sympathy of a large number of voters who, not having voted for Podemos, might have done it if they had known how successful the candidature was going to be in elections 4 . Having made this assumption, it is highly unlikely that the socio-demographic profile of this group would have differed significantly from those that actually voted Podemos, so, as is normal when only nonresponse bias is present the distributions that we obtain conditioning on recall vote are a true reflection of reality. Next, using the microdata of the 2014 EP post-electoral survey conducted by CIS [37] , we study the features of Podemos voters and compare them to its main competitors. Firstly, we will focus on their politi-
cal-ideological characteristics then analyze their socio-demographic profile. 4 Indeed, the analysis of the question about a hypothetical change of vote of the 2014 EP post-electoral survey [37] points on that line. This had not happened in the previous two occasions when this question was stated ( [38] and [8] ). In the 2004 General election post-election survey, after 11-M attacks [39] , the question took on a particularly relevant sense. Similarly, the PP landscape victory of 2011 also endowed particular meaning to this question. Paradoxically, both in 2004 and in 2011 between 96% and 98% of main formations (PP, PSOE and IU) voters declared that they would have kept their vote should have known the results ( [38] and [8] ).
However, after the 2014 EP elections, only Podemos (98%) and PP (96%) electorates expressed equivalent rates of loyalty. PSOE and IU voters showed significantly lower loyalty rates.
Political-Ideological Features
The first question is where did the votes for Podemos come from? In other words, from what party had the voters defected? Table S1 (supplemental material) Podemos to attract voters from the political space of majorities (see Table 1 Own elaboration using [37] , [40] and 2011 and 2014 actual results [41] . 5 In the space bounded between extreme left (1) and extreme right (10), the May 2014 average position of Spaniards [37] was placed at 4. [26] . These voters stated that they placed their ballot with "some doubts" or "with an uncomfortable feeling".
This lack of identification of voters with their parties, fed by cleavage changes and the growing concern for particular issues, is increasing the importance of electoral campaigns and blurring party lines. In fact, according to CIS [37] , in the 2014 EP election almost 40% of voters (80% in the case of Podemos) admitted to having decided their vote during the campaign, which is a milestone in Spanish electoral history.
Socio-Economic Profile
From a demographic perspective (Table 2) In socio-economic terms (Table 3) , Podemos stands out as attracting voters with no income but whose family environment was not so different from that of the general population and of its competitors. Indeed, its proportion of family members who were not main breadwinners is significantly higher than that in other parties, being more than 50% of its voters. This fact, along with the high proportion of young people, In short, in socio-demographical and socio-economical terms, the profile of Podemos first voters could be described as young, with leftist ideology and socially ascending, with a higher level of education and strong commitment to the new middle classes.
Podemos was not only working class but also a group that encompasses an electorate half-way between IU and PSOE profiles. These are not the only interesting issues that can be derived from this survey. Further analysis of microdata [37] 
Conclusions
In the European elections of May 2014, something unprecedented in Spanish politics occurred. A new, unknown group, created just four months earlier and without apparent financial resources, became the fourth political party of the country, triggering a political earthquake. What's more, according to polls, it was only a year later in a position to challenge in the next general election the supremacy of the two traditional major parties, PP and PSOE. Something confirmed two years later in the December, 2015
General election.
In this paper, we analyse the conditions that made this fact possible and the strategy followed by Podemos to harness the benefits that the economic, political and institutional crises offered to empower the emergence of a new political presence in Spain.
The innovative change of cleavages proposed by Podemos and the great exposure of its leader to mass media has enabled them to transmit to the people its new and fresh discourse, based on a new dichotomous division of society: the people against the (corrupted) elites.
Podemos is picking off the less-identified voters of both PP and PSOE, and mobilizing important areas of previous abstainers as well as gobbling up small parties. Compared to voters of major parties, Podemos supporters are younger, more urban and educated, and consequently they use digital social networks to a greater degree. Its support comes mainly from people located in the (extreme) left of the ideological spectrum and among those who see themselves as being lower-middle or middle class, those who are currently unemployed or those who are working but receiving a low salary, being mainly no family breadwinners. The analyses of CIS polls also support the main hypotheses of Podemos electoral strategy: the growing weakness of ideological identification of Spanish voters and their increased permeability to particular issues, and the election of Pablo Iglesias as party image given his increased exposure on TV (La Sexta and Cuatro).
